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Abstract. We propose a new index for measuring the systemic risk of default of the banking sector, which is 
based on a homogeneous version of multivariate intensity based models (Cuadras – Augé distribution). We 
compute the index for 10 European countries, exploiting the information incorporated in the CDS premia of 
44 large banks over the period January 2007 – September 2010. In this way, we provide a market based 
measure of the liability incurred by the Governments, due to the implicit bail-out guarantees they provide to 
the financial sector. We find that during the financial crisis the systemic component of the default risk in the 
banking sector has significantly increased in all countries, with the exception of Germany and the 
Netherlands. As a consequence, the Governments’ liability implicit in the bail out guarantee amounts to a 
quite relevant share of GDP in several countries: it is huge for Ireland, lower but still important for the 
other PIIGS (Italy is the least affected within this group) and for the UK. Finally, our estimate is very close 
to the overall amount of money already committed in the rescue plans adopted in Europe between October 
2008 and March 2010, despite strong cross-country differences: in particular, Germany and Ireland seem to 
have committed an amount of resources much larger than needed; to the contrary, the Italian Government 
has committed much less than it should.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In the current phase of the financial crisis, the question attracting most of attention and debate is the 
mutation and transmission of the credit virus from the banking system, where the epidemic started, 
to the Governments’ balance sheets. According to some interpretations of the crisis, the diffusion of 
the virus across financial institutions and markets was magnified by the accounting rules that were 
imposing to  mark-to-market assets and liabilities of all the players in the financial system.  
Someone could argue, with somewhat of a joke, that the most acute phase of the crisis was over 
when the problem exposures ended up in the only budget that is not evaluated at fair-value yet, 
namely  the Government budget. This argument calls for a question: if the implicit guarantee  
provided by each Government to its financial system were marked-to-market, what would be the 
impact on public debt figures? This paper addresses this question,  focusing on the situation of 
Europe. Addressing this question amounts to asking how much each Government should pay in 
order to buy insurance against default of one financial institution or even of the whole financial 
system. This can be done, as it is done for budgets of companies, by extracting this cost from 
market quotes, in this case the values of  Credit Default Swaps (CDS) written  on “names” of 
financial institutions. Notice that this question has nothing to do with arguments concerning 
whether the CDS markets provide faithful representations of credit risk, or whether their forecasting 
power is hampered by the risk premium embedded in them. No matter if one finds this risk 
premium excessive or not, this is the market price a Government should pay to buy protection 
against default of the financial system.  
This issue is relevant not only for academics and financial practitioners. It is becoming increasingly 
important in the policy debate on the reform of the Stability Pact in Europe, where some policy-
makers argue that private debt should be included in the evaluation of the financial soundness of 
member countries. Our paper contributes to this debate by introducing a methodology to estimate – 
using market data – the burden to be added to the debt/GDP ratio in each European country, due to 
the implicit bail-out guarantee that Governments provide to the financial sector. Following the 
dramatic consequences of the Lehman Brothers default, many Governments have announced and 
implemented rescue plans for the financial sector, creating the expectation of a wide bail-out policy. 
This expectation clearly emerges from CDS quotes: the default risk priced by the market shows a 
remarkable co-movement between the financial sector and the Government sector.   
The plan of the paper is the following. After reviewing the literature most closely related to our 
work (section 2), we lay out a multivariate intensity based model of credit risk (section 3), which 
provides the framework for our empirical methodology to measure the fragility of the financial 
sector of a country (section 4): we introduce here a new financial stability index (named “Cuadras-
Augé index”). In section 5 we present our empirical evidence, using a sample of 44 large banks 
located in 10 European countries: among other things, we provide here an estimate of the liability 
incurred by the European Governments, due to the implicit bail-out g uarantee. Section 6 
summarizes our main results. The detailed derivation of the financial stability index is postponed to 
Appendix 1. Finally, Appendix 2 provides detailed information on our sample.        
 
 
2. Related Literature  
 
  The idea that the implicit guarantee of bail out, provided by the Government to the financial 
sector, should be taken into account in the balance sheet of the public sector has been developed by 
Gray, Merton and Bodie (2006), and by Gapen, Gray, Lim and Xiao (2005). They apply the 
contingent claim analysis, where the bail out guarantee – particularly relevant for the “too-big-to-
fail” intermediaries – is modelled as a put option enabling a bank to sell its own assets to the 
Government, which pays a strike price equal to the value of the bank liabilities backed by the   3
guarantee. They provide a methodology for quantifying the value of the put option, which should be 
included in the asset side of the balance sheet of financial intermediaries and in the liability side of 
the public sector balance sheet. Although different from our work on technical grounds – they take 
a structural approach while we use an intensity based model – they share with us the idea that an 
accurate measurement of sovereign risk cannot ignore the interlinks between the different sectors of 
the economy, in particular between the financial and the public sectors.         
  The recent financial crisis has dramatically increased the need to asses the impact of the bail 
out measures taken by several Governments in order to avoid the collapse of the financial system. 
Through these measures – capital injections, debt guarantees, asset purchases and asset guarantees – 
the public sector has committed a huge amount of resources in several countries (we report some 
data below in section 5.3). The overall impact of this kind of interventions has been positive as far 
as the credit risk of financial institutions is concerned. BIS (2009) shows that the announcement and 
the implementation of rescue packages have been followed by a fall in bank CDS spreads, so they 
have indeed been able to reduce the default probability of banks as perceived by the market. 
However, they have at the same time increased the market price of sovereign risk. Ejsing and 
Lemke (2009) show that, following the announcement of rescue packages in the fall of 2008, a 
marked increase of sovereign CDS spreads has come along with the reduction of bank CDS spreads.    
  The analysis by Berndt and Obreja (2010) is closely related to ours. They study the 
correlation structure of weekly CDS returns for a large sample of European firms over the period 
2003 – 2008, showing that the co-movement among them increases dramatically after the onset of 
the financial crisis in August 2007. They trace back this result to the larger weight of a factor 
mimicking the economic catastrophe risk. These findings are in line with ours, which point to a 
significant increase of the systemic component in the default risk of European banks during the 
financial crisis, as we shall see below.  
  Finally, our work contributes to the debate on the sustainability of public debt. Starting with 
the seminal article by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), a number of studies have analysed the ability of 
the public sector to keep its debt on a sustainable path over time, namely a path consistent with the 
inter-temporal budget constraint
1. The approach taken here suggests that the rescue plans and the 
implicit guarantee of future bail  outs in support of the financial sector create a liability for the 
public sector, which should be taken into account in assessing the sustainability of the public debt.  
 
 
3. The multivariate intensity based model 
 
It is well known that credit risk models can be built either on the basis of economic information on 
the business activity and the balance sheet of the obligors, or on statistical information based on the 
probability distribution of the default event (default probability, DP) and the loss incurred in case of 
default (loss given default, LGD). The former class of models is referred to as the  structural 
approach to credit risk, while the second is known as the class of reduced form or intensity based 
models. In cases in which the default of the obligor may occur for reasons that do not depend, or not 
depend only, on the balance sheet structure, the reduced form approach is clearly preferable. This is 
actually the case when financial institutions are the obligors. As recent experience proves (and the 
ancient confirms), the default of a financial institution may occur for many reasons that are not 
strictly dependent on the balance sheet, such as a panic or a bank-run, or contagion and liquidity 
crises. For this reason, the model that we use to represent the credit risk of financial institutions, and 
of a financial system, is the simplest multivariate extension of an intensity based approach: this is 
called the Marshall-Olkin (1967) model. This model was first applied to credit risk by Esposito 
(2002), and was recently extended to a hierarchical structure by Durante et al. (2009).  
                                                 
1 See Baglioni and Cherubini (1993) for further references on this topic and for an application to Italy.   4
The idea is that the default probability of each financial institution is modelled as a Poisson process 
with intensity equal to i l ˆ . We remind that intensity is the instantaneous percentage increase of 
probability of an event, in our case the default event:  
 
( ) ( ) t P t dP i i i l ˆ =                                                                                                                                    (1) 
 
where  Pi(t) is the probability of  default. In the most straightforward and easy application the 
intensity may be considered constant or conditionally constant, that is constant given the 
information available. The probability of no event occurring by a given time T, that in our case is 
the probability of survival of the obligor, is then given by the simple formula 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) t T T P i i i - - = > l q ˆ exp                                                                                                                (2) 
 
where q denotes the default time. The default probability is of course the complement to one. The 
natural multivariate extension of this approach is to consider the probability of an event that causes 
the default of more than one obligor. So, the default intensity of each obligor should be decomposed 
into   
 
i i i x l l + = ˆ                                                                                                                                          (3) 
 
where li denotes the idiosyncratic components and xi collects the intensities of all events triggering 
default of the obligor alongside of others. Specifying  xi is actually the major problem with this 
model, since it would call for the default of all possible combinations of obligors. Typical shortcuts 
are to limit the dependence structure to the bivariate setting or to consider only a single factor 
triggering default of all the obligors. The latter solution seems the fittest one for our problem, since 
it would represent the risk of a systemic crisis of the banking system. In this case, we would set 
l x = i for all the financial institutions in the sample. Notice that imposing a specification amounts 
to select a specific dependence structure to the model. The correlation among default times of any 








=                                                                                                                              (4) 
 
where  lij  denotes the intensity of default of both obligors. In the systemic risk specification 








ij                                                                                                                                 (5) 
 
One could also specify the dependence structure separately from the probability of default of each 
obligor by extracting from the Marshall-Olkin distribution the corresponding copula function (see 
Nelsen, 2006 for a broad review). We remind that copula functions allow to specify separately the 
marginal distributions of variables and their dependence structure. The Marshall-Olkin copula turns 
out to be 
 
( ) ( )
n
n n n u u u u u u u u u C
a a a - - - = ,..., , min ... ,..., ,
2 1
1 2 2 1 2 1
)
                                                                              (6) 
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a ˆ =                                                                                                                                              (7) 
 
The joint survival probability of the credit exposures in a basket (that is the probability that default 
would not occur in a given period) can then be represented by computing 
( ) n DP DP DP C - - - 1 ,..., 1 , 1 ˆ
2 1 , where DPi is the default probability of the i-th obligor. Notice that the 
parameter  ai has an important interpretation in terms of systemic relevance of each obligor, 
meaning that the obligor for which this parameter is very close to 1 carries very little idiosyncratic 
risk. Notice that the notion of different ai values for different obligors correspond to the concept 
known in statistics as non-exchangeability, meaning that  ( ) ( ) i j j i DP DP C DP DP C - - „ - - 1 , 1 ˆ 1 , 1 ˆ . If 
one wished to endow the Marshall-Olkin copula with the exchangeability property, he would have 
to set  a a = i  for all exposures. This is known as Cuadras-Augé copula or exchangeable Marshall-
Olkin. As it is well known, copulas are non parametric representations of association among 
variables, and as such they are naturally linked to non-parametric measures of association. The 
measures that are used the most are Kendall’s t concordance index and Spearman’s  r rank 
correlation measure. Copula function parameters can be actually calibrated on these measures. In 
the case at hand, Kendall’s t can be computed to be 
ij
j j i i
j i
ij r




=                                                                                                                   (8) 
and, only for the Marshall-Olkin case, is equal to the correlation figure. As for Spearman’s r, one 
can compute instead 
j j i i
j i






=                                                                                                                   (9) 
In the case of  Cuadras-Augé copula  a a = i  implies  t t = ij  and  s ij s r r = ,  for all pairs. So, the 
Cuadras-Augé copula is well suited to represent the joint default probability distribution of a 
homogeneous set of exposures, where by homogeneous it is meant that the exposures have all the 
same probability of default and the same bivariate dependence structure. 
 
 
4. The Cuadras-Augé Financial Stability Index  
  
Having laid out the basics of the multivariate intensity based model, we propose here the 
methodology of our empirical analysis. Our task is to extract a synthetic financial stability index 
representing the creditworthiness of the financial sector of a country. The index must reflect both 
the average level of risk of each financial institution in the system and the correlation among them. 
Possibly, the index should be able to represent the degree of systemic and idiosyncratic risk in the 
financial system of a given country. As a warning, remember that this task is entirely different from 
that of specifying and estimating the joint probability distribution of the system. When we build a 
financial stability index what we are actually doing is to adapt a model, typically a homogeneous 
credit exposure model, to provide a close enough, albeit synthetic representation of risk. As the 
most famous example, one of the first indexes that was proposed in the industry, from the Moody’s 
rating agency, was called the diversity score. This index provided a representation of the credit risk 
of a portfolio in terms of a basket of homogeneous independent exposures. In this case, 
homogeneous only means that each exposure has the same probability of default, that is actually   6
meant to represent the average credit risk in the basket. Other financial stability indexes are 
computed and published by the IMF on a regular basis.  
We propose a new financial stability index, which is based on the homogeneous version of the 
multivariate intensity based models, that as we saw is called Cuadras-Augé distribution. For this 
reason we call it “ Cuadras-Augé index”. The index is synthetically represented in terms of a 
marginal intensityl ˆ which is the same for all the exposures in the set, and a dependence structure 
that is the same across all pairs of exposures (measured either in terms of concordance index, rank 
correlation or the a parameter).  A natural choice to calibrate the index is to set: 
i)  the marginal intensity equal to the average marginal intensity of the basket, and  
ii)  the correlation figure equal to some average of the figures in the correlation matrix. 
Collapsing the correlation matrix in a single figure is common usage in the basket credit derivatives 
market, where for some products the implied correlation is also used as a quoting device. The main 
difference with respect to our model is that while the gaussian copula is typically used in the 
market, here we apply the Cuadras-Augé one. It is also worth noting that there is an interesting 
symmetry in the fact that while the g aussian copula correlation stems directly from structural 
models of credit risk, the Cuadras-Augé is the direct offspring of intensity based models. Here we 








=                                                                                                                             (10)                                                             
 
for each pair and we want to come up with a representation of the average dependence of the system 







                                                                                                                    (11)
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As for the solution of this problem, in Appendix 1 it is shown that if the harmonic mean is used to 
represent average correlation, this yields a filter that amounts to the figure  m l l a ˆ / ”  in the 









=                                           (13) 
and H denotes the harmonic mean of the Pearson coefficients. The same procedure could be applied 
to rank correlation, remembering that in Marshall-Olkin structures we have 
( ) ij j i
ij




= ˆ ˆ 2
3
,                                        (14)   7











=                                                            (15)   
     
where Hs denotes the harmonic mean of the rank-correlation coefficients. 
 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
5.1 The  data set 
We report here a general description of the data set, which is described in greater detail in Appendix 
2 (Table A1). We collected data for the banking systems of 10 European countries, with a total of 
44 banks.  The selected banks were those used for the stress test exercise performed by the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) in July 2010. From this sample, we dropped 
those banks for which Credit Default Swap data were not available. Our sample includes the banks 
with the highest systemic relevance in Europe, since all the major institutions  are included, 
accounting for a large market share in each country. For all the banks in the sample, as well as for 
Governments, we collected a data set of CDS spreads for the 5 year maturity; the sample period 
goes from January 2007 to September 2010.  




it = l ˆ                                                                                                                                       (16) 
 
where CDSit denotes the CDS quote of the i-th name at time t. By market convention, the reference 
LGD figure used to compute the price is set equal to 60%. Once the five-year intensity figure has 
been extracted, we computed survival probabilities of all the names in the sample. Then, for each 
country we reckoned the rank correlation figure using a rolling window of one year of data. This 
way, for most of the countries we have a time series of rank correlation matrices starting from 
January 2008. In cases in which data quality was particularly poor, the time series started later. In 
all cases, we have all the data for 2009 and 2010 (with the slight exception of Greece for which the 
first quarter is missing). Having done this, we applied the Cuadras-Augé filter described in section 4 
to represent an index of the systemic risk component. Concerning the computation of the filter, we 
faced the problem of some negative correlation figures, while the computation of harmonic mean 
can only be computed for positive variables. In this case, we could have either excluded these 
negative figures from the computation of the mean or computed the arithmetic mean instead of the 
harmonic one. We decided to follow the latter route. This leads to an overvaluation of the filter, 
because the harmonic mean is lower than the arithmetic one: however, this effect is somewhat 
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5. 2. The Probability of a Banking Crisis 
In figure 1 we report the intensities of a systemic event for our sample. It is easy to note an upsurge 
of this risk in February 2009 when the effects of the banking crisis of 2008 displayed their effects in 
full. Following the Greek crisis the increase in the probability of a banking crisis reached heights 
that had never been seen before, and not only for Greece. The countries that are exposed the most 
are, beyond Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The other countries are clearly part of a different 
cluster, with Italy, Austria and UK with the highest risk among those countries.  





  Table 1. Risk adjusted probability of a  systemic shock to the banking system 
Date  17/03/2008  15/09/2008  16/03/2009  15/09/2009  15/03/2010 15/09/2010 
Portugal  6,18%  7,05%  6,47%  5,26%  10,15%  26,06% 
Ireland  16,06%  21,46%  40,61%  15,97%  15,70%  30,05% 
Italy  9,22%  6,03%  11,86%  4,43%  6,17%  12,42% 
Greece          29,02%  45,45% 
Spain      19,03%  9,20%  9,49%  21,06% 
Germany  6,27%  4,43%  8,12%  3,46%  5,85%  4,57% 
France  11,27%  8,97%  8,82%  4,83%  4,56%  6,56% 
UK  12,96%  10,07%  13,91%  5,10%  8,05%  9,85% 
Netherlands   10,79%  7,65%  10,45%  4,46%  5,84%  8,15% 
Austria  14,01%  12,14%  31,96%  12,58%  11,42%  13,02% 
 
Table 1 reports the values of the probability of a systemic shock priced in the CDS for each country. 
Figure 2 enables to appreciate the relevance of the systemic risk out of the overall average risk. The 
dynamics of the filter represents the ratio of the systemic to the average intensity, which is actually 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































parameter of the financial sector of each country. The main feature emerging from the graph is the 
recent increase of the systemic content of default intensity for all countries, with the noticeable 
exceptions of Germany and the Netherlands (see also  Table 2 below). The counterparty of this 
evidence is that for all the countries, where we have found an increase of average rank correlation in 
the  latest period of the sample, we also observe an increase of concentration of the correlation 
values between pairs.  
Figure 2. Cuadras-Augé filter. Maximum, minimum and average values. 10 European 
countries 
 
Table 2 reports, for the same dates as those in Table 1, the values of the filter a . The economic 
meaning is the percentage relevance of a systemic shock out of the average probability of a credit 
event. Note that in the final observations of the sample the filter is very close to 1 for all countries, 
except Germany and the Netherlands. The case of Germany is peculiar, since the filter is around 
55%, much lower than anywhere else.  
 
  Table 2. Relevance of the systemic event  
Date  17/03/2008  15/09/2008 16/03/2009  15/09/2009  15/03/2010  15/09/2010 
Portugal  64,14%  63,81%  48,68%  69,07%  89,69%  98,62% 
Ireland  99,65%  97,71%  98,99%  98,39%  99,48%  98,91% 
Italy  90,19%  82,16%  87,61%  85,75%  93,59%  96,14% 
Greece          97,06%  99,11% 
Spain      83,96%  67,32%  63,97%  95,78% 
Germany  66,03%  52,69%  66,71%  42,77%  69,59%  55,51% 
France  99,10%  98,05%  89,21%  84,59%  93,19%  98,24% 
UK  99,05%  94,29%  90,82%  71,61%  93,28%  94,95% 
Netherland   92,77%  88,41%  57,50%  55,06%  69,54%  80,03% 
























































































































































































































































































































































5. 3. The Bail-out Cost of a Banking Crisis 
European Governments have committed a huge amount of money to restore public confidence in 
the financial sector, starting from the most acute phase of the financial crisis, namely in the 
aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse. In the period running from October 2008 through 
March 2010, the member States of EU-27 have committed an overall amount of resources equal to 
4,131 bn euro, equivalent to 32.6% of their GDP
2. Table 3 reports a breakdown of the intervention 
measures taken by the Governments of the ten countries covered by our analysis. 
The bulk of the involved resources have been devoted to guarantee schemes. Governments have 
relied extensively on this tool, particularly until mid-2009, as it is the most cost-effective way for 
restoring the confidence of investors. Banks’ liabilities are backed by the guarantee provided by the 
State; at the same time the Government budget is not hit by an immediate outlay. The “take-up rate” 
– the actual use of funds relative to the allocated amounts – is on average 32%, but it is much higher 
in some individual countries (like Portugal: 51%).  
Many banks turned out to b e under-capitalized during the financial crisis. Governments have 
reacted by approving both  recapitalization schemes for the bank sector as a whole and ad hoc 
measures for individual troubled institutions. The take-up rate differs remarkably between the two 
kinds of intervention: 27% for schemes and 90% for ad hoc cases. The reason is that individual 
measures have been designed to meet well defined and urgent needs to restore a sufficient capital 
base of some institutions.  
Two countries, namely UK and Ireland, account for the bulk (80%) of the third kind of intervention: 
impaired assets relief, where the Government either provides an insurance against assets 
devaluation or it directly buys some bank troubled assets. While Ireland has approved a major asset 
relief scheme, the intervention in UK has been on an individual basis.  
 
Table 3 - Government commitments supporting the financial sector (Oct. 2008 – March 2010) 
(billions euro) 
   Guarantee schemes 
Recapitalization 
schemes  Other (*)  Individual cases  TOTAL 
AUSTRIA  75  15    0,5  90,5 
FRANCE  265  23,95    62,2  351,15 
GERMANY  400  80    107,6  587,6 
GREECE  15  5  8    28 
IRELAND  376    54  25,6  455,6 
ITALY    20      20 
NETHERLANDS  200      56,2  256,2 
PORTUGAL  16  4    0,5  20,5 
SPAIN  200  99  30    329 
UK  381,87  62,79    405,6  850,26 
TOTAL  1928,87  309,74  92  658,2  2988,81 
           
Source: EU (2010)         
(*) Liquidity and asset relief schemes         
 
Table 4 shows – for each of the countries included in our sample – the overall cost of the different 
kinds of intervention outlined above, both as a proportion of the banking sector size and as a ratio to 
GDP. The numbers reported in the table highlight the existence of great differences across 
countries. Ireland has committed an incredibly large amount of resources, both in terms of bank 
assets and as a ratio to GDP. It is followed by UK and the Netherlands: they have implemented 
interventions for amounts equivalent to about a half of their GDP. All the other countries have 
committed important amounts of resources, putting at stake a significant share of their GDP, 
                                                 
2 See EU (2010).   11
although lower than in such extreme cases. The only exception is Italy: the Italian Government 
distinguishes for having spent a negligible amount of money. 
 




of Bank Sector 
Total Assets) 
(A) 
Bank Sector Total 






AUSTRIA  8,78  3,72  32,68 
FRANCE  4,59  4,01  18,41 
GERMANY  7,90  3,09  24,41 
GREECE  5,69  2,07  11,79 
IRELAND  27,88  9,99  278,58 
ITALY  0,53  2,46  1,32 
NETHERLANDS  11,56  3,89  44,93 
Portugal  3,94  3,17  12,51 
SPAIN  9,55  3,28  31,30 
UK  8,99  6,04  54,27 
       
Sources. Government commitments: EU (2010).  
Bank sector total assets (end-2009): ECB (BoE for UK). GDP (2009):Eurostat
 
The burden of the state interventions as a ratio to GDP is the outcome of two factors: the amounts 
of public resources committed as a share of the size of the banking sector, and in turn the size of 
this sector relative to GDP. An interesting question is whether any relationship exists between such 
two factors. Figure 3 provides a tentative answer, and it is positive. It is easy to see that in those 
countries where the banking sector is larger in proportion to the economy,  Governments have been 
induced to intervene more heavily in support of the financial system. In particular, the huge amount 
of funds pledged by Ireland and the UK can be partially explained by the very large size of their 
financial sectors. The well known “too-big-to-fail” doctrine states that  a Government cannot let a 
very large financial institution go bust, since the implied cost for the whole economic system would 
be too high. The preliminary evidence reported here points to a sort of “too-big-to-fail” doctrine at 
the macro level: the incentive for a Government to bail out the financial system altogether is 
stronger, the larger the size of that sector relative to the economy of the country. Of course, this is 
an issue deserving further analysis and explanation.           
   12
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5.4. Marking-to-Market the bail-out guarantees to the Financial System 
We now gather (in Table 5) the risk-neutral figures concerning the probability of a systemic 
shock to the financial system and those concerning the bail out programs, in order to address the 
issue of the adequacy of such programs with respect to the actuarial cost of systemic events. In 
particular, we provide a measure of the liability incurred by the public sector, due to a systemic 
shock to the financial sector. This exercise rests on the assumption that Governments provide an 
implicit bail-out guarantee to the financial sector. This assumption is justified both by the huge 
amount of resources already committed by Governments under the rescue plans illustrated in the 
previous section, and by the strong correlation between the patterns of CDS spreads between the 
public and the financial sectors: this evidence shows that the Governments are expected to take up 
the losses possibly incurred by banks, following a bail-out policy. 
 
  Table 5. Mark-to-market of the implicit guarantee to a systemic shock (bn euro) 
  Intensity  DP  LGD  Government 
Liability 
Commitments  Liability - 
Commitments 
Portugal  6,04%  26,06%  312,12  73,68  20  53,68 
Ireland  7,15%  30,05%  980,4  266,85  430  -163,15 
Italy  2,65%  12,42%  2248,62  252,98  20  232,98 
Greece  12,12%  45,45%  295,14  121,51  28  93,51 
Spain  4,73%  21,06%  2068,08  394,57  329  65,57 
Germany  0,94%  4,57%  4461,66  184,89  480  -295,11 
France  1,36%  6,56%  4594,02  273,00  288,95  -15,95 
UK  2,07%  9,85%  5677,2  506,61  444,66  61,95 
Netherland  1,70%  8,15%  1330,2  98,23  200  -101,77 
Austria  2,79%  13,02%  618,12  72,90  90  -17,10 
Total  2245,23  2330,61  -85,38   13
 
We briefly describe how to read the results of the table. In the first column we report the intensity of 
a systemic shock evaluated according to our financial stability index on September 15
th 2010. In the 
column headed DP we report the probability of occurrence of the systemic shock over the horizon 
of our analysis, that is 5 year. Next to it, we report the severity of the systemic shock, computed 
assuming a  loss given default figure (LGD) of 60% of  the banking sector  total assets for each 
country. We use 60% because this is the value conventionally used to derive quotes in the credit 
default market. The Government liability is the actuarial value of the implicit bail-out guarantee to 
the financial sector, and it is computed by multiplying the probability of occurrence of a systemic 
shock times its severity and the five year discount factor (corresponding to a five year risk free rate 
of about 2%). The next column reports the commitments to support the banking systems, excluding 
those spent for individual cases.  
As a word of caution we must say that the Government liability is computed under a strong 
assumption, namely that the Government is called to bail out the whole banking system of the 
country in case of a default shock. This can be justified by recalling that we are focusing here on 
systemic risk, which plays a dominant role under the current crisis (see the last column of Table 2). 
On one hand, it is true that this assumption might lead us to overstate the Government liability. On 
the other hand, it is also true that the observed loss given default is often larger than what we 
assume (60%): for example, it is around 80% for Lehman Brothers and Anglo-Irish Bank; under 
this regard, we might be under-estimating the Government liability in a bail-out intervention. 
We can see that the estimated m arket values of the bail-out guarantees needed to face a systemic 
crisis in the banking sector are associated to the commitments actually devoted  by European 
Governments to such purpose. On one side, the total amounts are very similar, namely 2245 billion 
euros against 2330. On the other side, the degree of association can be clearly appreciated in Figure 
4. Note that if this association is quite clear across all countries, the difference between guarantees 
and commitments shows quite a large degree of variation from one country to the others. The two 
extreme cases are:  Germany, for which the commitments are largely higher than the actual value of 
the guarantee, and this can be associated to the low systemic content of default intensity; and Italy, 
which reports the lowest level of commitments along with Portugal, in spite of much greater 
dimension of the banking system. A surprise is that Ireland is the country that, after Germany, has 
the highest positive difference between the value of commitments and that of the guarantees
3.   
     
                                                 
3 We have run the exercise shown in Figure 4 also by subtracting the exposure to the Government of the own country 
from the total assets of each bank, since in several countries this exposure is quite relevant. In case of distress, a bank 
can transfer its portfolio of Government bonds to its creditors, thus reducing the liability of the Government involved in 
a bail-out. However the results obtained are very similar to those reported here, so we decided not to show them to save 
space (of course, they are available upon request).     14
Figure 4. Government liabilities due to systemic shocks and actual commitments 
 
 
Finally, in Table 6 we report the impact of the bail-out guarantee on the public debt/GDP figures. 
We can see that the problem is worst for Ireland, and the reason is the  huge dimension of the 
banking system relative to GDP (see Table 4, column B). The impact is lower but still quite relevant 
for the other PIIGS; among these countries, Italy is the one which suffers the lowest burden, thanks 
to the relative strength of its banking system. Among the other countries, UK is the one most hit by 
the bail-out liability: just like it happens for Ireland, the size of the banking sector plays a crucial 
role.    
 
 
  Table 6. Bail-out Government liability and 
Debt/GDP 
  Debt/GDP  Liability/GDP  Total 
Portugal  76,80%  44,96%  121,76% 
Ireland  64,00%  163,17%  227,17% 
Italy  115,80%  16,63%  132,43% 
Greece  115,10%  51,16%  166,26% 
Spain  53,20%  37,54%  90,74% 
Germany  73,20%  7,68%  80,88% 
France  77,60%  14,31%  91,91% 
UK  68,10%  32,34%  100,44% 
Netherlands  60,90%  17,23%  78,13% 






























































































 6. Summary and conclusions 
 
  We have introduced a new methodology for measuring the systemic risk of default of the 
banking sector and we have applied it to the European countries. Our methodology is built within 
the framework of multivariate intensity based models, and it is based on a homogeneous version of 
such models, called Cuadras – Augé distribution. The filter we derive measures the relevance of 
systemic risk (due to the likelihood of a shock spreading to the whole banking system) relative to 
the average default probability of individual banks. We have computed the index for 10 European 
countries, exploiting the information incorporated in the CDS premia of 44 banks over the period 
January 2007 – September 2010. In this way, we can provide a market based measure of the 
liability incurred by the Governments, due to the implicit bail-out guarantees they provide to the 
financial sector of the economy. We then compare this estimate with the actual resources committed 
so far by the European Governments through the rescue plans adopted between October 2008 and 
March 2010.   
  Our main results may be summarized as follows. During the financial crisis, the systemic 
component of the default risk in the banking sector has significantly increased in all countries, with 
the exception of Germany and the Netherlands. The most recent data (September 2010) show that 
almost all the risk of default of individual banks is accounted for by the systemic component. As a 
consequence, the Governments’ liability implicit in the bail out guarantee amounts to a quite 
relevant share of GDP in several countries: it is huge for Ireland, lower but still important for the 
other PIIGS (Italy is the least affected within this group) and for the UK. The two crucial factors 
determining these results are: (i) the correlation among the default probabilities of banks within a 
country; (ii) the size of the banking system relative to the economy of each country. Finally, our 
estimate is very close to the overall amount of money committed in rescue plans at the European 
level. However, strong cross-country differences emerge under this regard: in particular, Germany 
and Ireland seem to have committed an amount of resources much larger than needed; to the 
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Appendix 1. Cuadras-Augé Filter 
 
Assume we want to represent a set of variables with Marshall-Olkin distribution with a set of 
homogeneous variables. Homogeneous means that the variables must have: 
a)  same marginal distribution,  
b)  same bivariate correlation. 
We design here a filter to accomplish this task. Since the filter turns the Marshall-Olkin system into 
a homogeneous one, we call the technique Cuadras-Augé filter because it turns the system into a 
homogeneous (and so exchangeable) Marshall-Olkin system that is known as Cuadras-Augé 
system. 










= ˆ ˆ                  (A1) 
where  i l ˆ  and  j l ˆ  denote marignal intensities and lij collects common shocks that reach both assets. 
Remember that in Marshall-Olkin model this is also equal to the Kendall’s tau statistic. We want to 
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As for the common intensity, a natural choice would be to recover it from some average correlation 
value: in other terms, we want to extract  l  from an average r value. To obtain this result, it is 
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Notice that the sum includes n(n – 1)/2 terms, that is the number of elements below the diagonal of 
the correlation matrix. We now substitute the correlation terms  
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Notice that in the double sum each marginal intensity  i l ˆ  compares n – 1 times. So, we have  
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where we have substituted the average marginal intensity. If we now substitute equation (A8) in 
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Using the same strategy it is possible to design a filter that uses rank-correlation, that is Spearman’s 
rho. In this case one exploits the relationship 
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where Hs is the harmonic mean of rank correlation. 
 
 
Appendix 2. The data set 
 
Table A.1 below provides a description of our data set, which includes 44 banks representing 10 
European countries.  





Sample banks' total 
assets over bank 
sector assets (%)  
(B) 
Risk-weighted 
assets (bn euro) 
(C) 
Exposure to own 
country 





Tier 1 ratio 
(F) 
ALLIED IRISH BANKS  179,02    121,6  2,31  14,6  7,0 
BANK OF IRELAND  181,82    104,6  0,65  14,0  9,2 
IRELAND  360,84  22,1  226,2  1,48  14,3  8,1 
PIRAEUS BANK  48,95    37,4  16,97  13,6  9,1 
ALPHA BANK  67,83    51,1  7,47  10,1  11,6 
EFG EUROBANK  84,62    47,6  8,81  14,3  11,2 
NATIONAL BANK GREECE  113,99    67,4  17,33  15,0  11,3 
GREECE  315,38  64,1  203,5  12,65  13,3  10,8 
BANCO PASTOR  32,17    18,7  8,20  14,0  10,5 
BANKINTER  54,55    30,7  3,18  17,0  7,5 
CAIXA CATALUNA  273,43    52,9  1,49  50,6  6,6 
SABADEL  83,22    58,0  5,85  13,6  9,0 
BANCO POPULAR  129,37    92,6  5,85  14,5  9,1 
CAJA MADRID  193,01    223,1  12,55  7,6  8,6 
BBVA  394,41    290,1  13,22  10,0  9,4 
SANTANDER  423,08    562,6  11,97  5,2  10,0 
SPAIN  1583,22  45,9  1328,5  7,79  16,6  8,8 
BANCO BPI  47,55    26,1  8,88  17,0  8,5 
ESPIRITO SANTO  85,31    67,9  5,49  11,7  7,7 
BCP  13,99    65,6  6,81  1,9  9,3 
CAIXA GERAL  121,68    71,0  5,56  13,7  8,4 
PORTUGAL  268,53  51,6  230,6  6,69  11,1  8,5 
UBI BANCA      85,7      8,0 
MONTEPASCHI  225,87    120,9  12,29  15,7  7,5 
INTESASANPAOLO  424,48    361,8  15,00  9,9  8,3 
UNICREDIT  375,52    452,4  10,34  6,9  8,6 
ITALY  1025,87  27,4  1020,7  12,54  10,8  8,1 
SNS BANK  58,74    25,9  6,00  22,6  10,7 
ABN AMRO  203,50    118,7  4,83  9,8  13,0 
RABOBANK  425,87    236,3  2,21  12,2  14,1 
ING  888,11    332,4  0,47  19,9  10,2 
NETHERLAND  1576,22  71,1  713,3  3,38  16,1  12,0 
LLOYDS  648,25    580,4  0,93  9,0  9,6 
BARCLAYS  1561,54    450,2  0,69  20,9  13,0 
HSBC  851,05    871,7  0,00  7,1  10,8 
RBS  1311,89    515,7  1,79  15,6  14,4 
UK  4372,73  46,2  2418,0  0,85  13,2  12,0 
BAYERN LB      135,7      10,9 
LBBW      142,5      9,8 
WEST LB      35,7      14,4 
HSH NORDBANK  171,33    71,4  6,75  14,9  10,5   19
POSTBANK  227,97    68,7    34,0  7,1 
DZ BANK  219,58    95,0    19,3  9,9 
HYPO  362,24    81,0    41,6  9,4 
COMMERZ  609,79    280,1  7,02  14,7  10,5 
DEUTSCHE BANK  1542,66    273,5    40,7  12,7 
GERMANY  3133,57  42,1  1183,5  6,88  27,5  10,0 
SOCIETE GENERALE  891,61    324,1  1,69  21,2  10,7 
CREDIT AGRICOLE  522,38    538,9  4,86  8,6  9,7 
BNP  1246,15    620,7  1,45  14,1  10,1 
FRANCE  2660,14  34,7  1483,7  2,67  14,7  10,2 
RZB  148,95    94,5  2,78  12,1  9,3 
ERSTE BANK  79,72    125,5  7,27  5,0  9,2 
AUSTRIA  228,67  22,2  219,9  5,03  8,6  9,3 
             
Country lines show total values for columns (A)-(B)-(C) and mean values for columns (D-(E)-(F)      
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